A mixed legal system with a constitution on top: South African law in the era of democracy by Lewis, Carole
A
rticle
12
Amicus Curiae Issue 57 January/February 2005
Wehave a mixed legal system – an unusual blendof sources of law which apply as the accidentalresult of the history of the country and its
constituent parts. The laws in force in 1994, some dating
back to the Roman law of the sixth century AD, and to
English law to a considerable extent when parts of the
country were colonized, continue to apply now but subject
of course to the constitution.
Roman-Dutch law in force in the seventeenth century
was brought by the colonists of the Dutch East India
Company to the Cape (of Good Hope) in 1653. At that
time the law was already a mixture of the Roman law as it
had been received in Europe in the middle ages, and of the
law of the Germanic tribes who inhabited the Netherlands.
The Roman law was that codified at the instance of the
Emperor Justinian in the middle of the sixth century BC.
The body of law received into South Africa was thus the
Roman law, as a living system, with the commentaries and
interpretation of several scholarly lawyers from Holland:
Voet, De Groot, Van der Keessel et al.
When the English colonized the Cape various features of
the English law were superimposed onto the Roman-
Dutch law, and in several areas of the law English principles
and rules predominated, some eventually incorporated by
statute, as in the law of evidence and negotiable
instruments and company law. By the turn of the
nineteenth century the court systems, and both civil and
criminal procedure, were largely fashioned on the English
model. It is no coincidence that some of the greatest judges
of the era studied in England.
After the Anglo Boer war, when the various Republics
and colonies unified to become the Union of South Africa
in 1910, the mixed system of law was essentially settled. In
so far as common law was concerned, Roman and Roman-
Dutch law were still living sources of the law, as were many
English principles, especially in the areas of commercial
law, evidence and court procedures. (In the 1950s an
attempt was made by a number of Afrikaans legal
academics to “purify” the law of its English influence, and
they had some effect on the courts, especially the very
conservative, executive-minded Appellate Division of the
sixties, seventies and eighties). Existing side by side with
these European imports were systems of customary law
applied by black people. In certain areas of the law,
customary law was recognized by the state, in particular in
family law and in succession. Superimposed on these
systems was legislation governing black marriages, divorce
and succession.
The Union adopted the so-called Westminster system of
Government: a separation of powers, with Parliament
being supreme. It was elected by white citizens throughout
the country and also by coloured citizens in the Cape.
Parliament consisted of a legislature (akin to the House of
Commons) and a Senate and was, and still is, located in
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In 1994, with the advent of democracy in South Africa, the legal system then in force
was left intact, but was turned upside down. A new, but interim, constitution was
adopted (and replaced in 1996 with a final constitution) which made all law
subordinate to the constitution, and introduced a Bill of Rights, entrenching certain
fundamental human rights and the values of freedom, equality and dignity for all. The
constitution is now the supreme law of the land and any law inconsistent with it has
no effect. However, to understand the significance and effect of the constitution on the
legal system formerly prevailing in SA one must have some appreciation of its origin
and history.
Cape Town. The executive of Government was, and still is,
in Pretoria, and the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court (now the Supreme Court of Appeal) was located in
Bloemfontein – a small farming town in an arid and dusty
part of the Orange Free State (a former Boer Republic
named for the river that divided it from other areas. The
Orange River itself was named after William of Orange).
The location of the highest court of appeal was a function
of political appeasement of the former republic.
Lawyers continued to be trained for the most part in
England. When universities were established in South
Africa, and legal degrees were recognized, that changed.
The new route to becoming an advocate became the LLB,
preceded by an undergraduate degree. English legal
degrees were recognized until the 1960’s, however.
Attorneys – solicitors – qualified through a diploma and
articles of clerkship. Many read for the LLB, however, and
that became the standard route of qualification. The
divided bar is still in place, though fusion is often spoken
about.
With Union in 1910 one Supreme Court with provincial
divisions in the four provinces was established: local
divisions were added on in some of the bigger provinces.
There were and are magistrates’ courts throughout the
country with both civil and criminal jurisdiction. When the
final constitution was passed in 1996, the Supreme Court
of South Africa was abolished and in its place were created
high courts in the new provinces, and the SCA in the place
of the former Appellate Division. The Constitutional
Court, at the apex, was formally established in 1995. It is
headed by a Chief Justice and 10 other judges, and is the
final court of appeal in constitutional matters. It can
exercise original jurisdiction in exceptional cases, and has
recently done so, but in a matter where the substantive
issues were already before the court on appeal in other
related matters. The court sits only en banc.
Thus in the 80 or so years preceding the adoption of the
interim constitution a blend of civil and common law rules
were applied (our principle of stare decisis is the same as that
in England), as of course did legislation. Parliament was
supreme. It was not open to a court to question a statutory
provision. So it was that apartheid flourished: Parliament,
from the start of the twentieth century, introduced racial
laws providing for discrimination in the workplace, and
segregation in geographical areas, indeed in every sphere of
life. And the courts were unable, and in the era of
Nationalist party rule, often unwilling in any event, to
challenge any statutory provision on the basis that it was
discriminatory or unjust. So laws providing for detention
without trial, or creating a host of criminal offences such as
crossing racial barriers in one’s personal life, could not
legally be challenged.
The constitution, born out of a struggle against an
iniquitous legal order, is now the supreme law of the land.
And any law, whether of the common law or embodied in
a statute, passed before or after the advent of the
constitution, may be challenged and pronounced invalid.
The High Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal have
jurisdiction over constitutional matters, and may declare
any law to be inconsistent with a principle or right in the
constitution, and thus of no effect. If, however, a provision
of a statute is declared invalid, that must be confirmed by
the Constitutional Court. Appeals in respect of
constitutional issues lie against the decisions of the High
Courts and the Supreme Court of Appeal to the
Constitutional Court.
The impact of a new constitutional order has had a
profound effect on the lives of many. Not only are the
rights to equality, freedom and dignity entrenched, but
other rights – socio-economic rights – are given effect too:
thus rights to education, to housing, to freedom of
information, to administrative justice, to access to the
courts, and to fair trial are protected in much the same way.
In the field of criminal law, an accused person’s right to
silence has been entrenched and adumbrated; reverse onus
provisions have been declared unconstitutional; the right to
a fair trial without undue delay has been confirmed. In
administrative law, the right to fair administrative action is
now not only entrenched, but a Promotion of
Administrative Justice Act (required by the constitution)
regulates the rights of individuals against administrative
bodies. The common law of delict (tort) has been
particularly well-developed in a series of judgments in the
Supreme Court of Appeal and in the Constitutional Court.
Employment law too has been developed, but less so
perhaps than other fields because it had already been
developed at the instance primarily of trades unions in the
eighties and nineties. But the right to equality will
undoubtedly have a marked effect in time to come. Indeed,
equality courts are supposed to have been set up and
considerable resources have been expended on training
judicial officers for the purpose. As far as I know, though,
they have not yet started operating, and my view is that all
courts are required to consider matters of equality and
there should be no special courts
Customary law remains in place: but there is a
considerable tension in certain areas where rights such as
equality and dignity are in conflict with customs,
particularly in relation to the status of women. Polygyny is
still practiced by certain people. The status of a polygynous
marriage has yet to be tested against rights in the Bill. But
early in October 2004 the Constitutional Court handed
down a judgment declaring the African rule of
primogeniture to be unconstitutional in the context of the
law of succession, since it discriminates against women and
extra-marital children: the court ordered that the law be
applied so as to bring the customary principle in line with
the values of equality and dignity, and that until there is
legislative amendment to the statutes giving effect to the
principle, deceased estates be administered in accordance
with the precepts of fairness and justice. 13
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Cultural conflicts of laws: the example of the Australian
public appropriation of indigenous heritage
(Issues in Cultural Property. This lecture is eligible for one
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When dealing with Islamic marriages, the courts have
accorded rights formerly only accorded to those married
under the common law, to people married by Islamic right:
rights of succession, and to compensation for the death of
a partner, have been recognized. Moreover, a partner in a
same-sex union has been accorded the right to a
dependant’s action for loss of support; and the question
whether there can be a marriage between same-sex
partners is currently before the Supreme Court of Appeal,
which heard the matter in September but has yet to hand
down judgment.
Of particular interest is the horizontal applicability of
the rights in the Bill. The rights are enforceable not only
against the state but against other individuals too where
appropriate. The full extent of horizontal application has
yet to be seen. But recently, in cases of defamation (libel
and slander), and in contractual matters, the courts have
had little hesitation in invoking values underpinning the
constitution in civil matters between private litigants. Of
particular interest is the constitutional injunction in the
Bill of Rights (s 39(2)) to develop the common law and
customary law, and to interpret legislation, so as ‘to
promote the spirit, object and purport of the Bill of
Rights’. There is at present much debate on the wisdom of
allowing the courts supremacy over the legislature, and
those who believe in a majoritarian democracy question
the courts’ ability to find that legislation – the expression
of the will of the people – is unenforceable. But it is a
debate that cannot be entered into here.
The transformation of the legal system in the 10 years of
democracy in South Africa has been a slow one. But it has
also been steady. One of the ironies is that the system of
Roman-Dutch law (really South African law since the early
part of the twentieth century) lives very comfortably in a
constitutional democracy. It was the legislation
superimposed on the common law from the nineteenth
century onwards, by both the Republics founded by the
people originating in Europe, and by the English colonies,
that formed the basis of apartheid. That basis was built
upon by the Nationalist Government when it came to
power in 1948 until a massive edifice of racist and
oppressive laws was in place. What has been deconstructed
now is essentially the legal edifice created in the twentieth
century. The principles of public and private law, now freed
from the shackles of racism and oppression, function
effectively and fairly, subject to the constitution, in the
twenty first century.
Carole Lewis
Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal, South Africa
Inns of Court and Institute of Advanced Legal Studies Fellow,
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